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The Characteristics of Markets
that Facilitate
Consumer Exploitation
by Joel Stonedale*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Behavioral economists have offered plentiful evidence that consumers
sometimes deviate from rational economic decision-making in predictable

1
ways due to cognitive biases. The effect of the biases, however, varies
2
greatly across markets. Scholars have identified several markets as
particularly exploitative, including the markets for subprime mortgages,
credit cards, cell phone services, video rentals, and retail rebates?
What separates these markets from the markets for thousands of other
complex products, such as computers and cars, in which consumers
appear able to understand their preferences and the product well enough
to drive the market toward efficiency? This Article addresses the
of the market
problem with consumer exploitation and describes some
4
characteristics that facilitate consumer exploitation. Specifically, Part
III describes the following characteristics that facilitate consumer
exploitation: multiple transactions within one contract, multidimensional
pricing, individualized products, infrequency of purchase, large
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proportion of consumers that are not middle-aged, and newness of the
market.
Understanding the market characteristics that lead to exploitation
may be useful in estimating the scope of consumer exploitation.
Exploitative markets should be distinguished from markets generally.
One could conclude from the growing list of competitive markets where
exploitation appears common that exploitation is either a normal
characteristic of consumer markets or that it is more common than it
actually is. This Article intends to shed light on the scope of the
problem by demonstrating that these markets share a few characteristics, explaining how those characteristics facilitate exploitation, and
showing how these characteristics are limited to particular types of
markets. This does not mean that these characteristics are necessary to
the existence of exploitative markets or that all markets with these
characteristics will be exploitative. Rather, it appears that these
characteristics play a large part in facilitating exploitation. If a market
has some of these characteristics, there is a greater chance that it will
be exploitative.
II.

DESCRIBING THE PROBLEM: How EXPLOITATION LEADS TO
INEFFICIENCY

A transaction is usually wealth-increasing because it transfers an
asset to the party that values the asset most. Therefore, the buyer must
value the asset more than the seller. If this were not the case, the seller
would not sell or the buyer would not buy. But when the buyer does not
fully understand the product or the price, there is a risk that the
transaction will occur even though the buyer does not actually value the
product more than the price he pays. Such a transaction may transfer
the asset to the party that values it less.
In addition to the above-described problem of transferring assets to
buyers that value the assets less than the sellers, exploitation also
causes buyers to substitute more expensive products for cheaper ones
that are equally effective. 5 It causes inefficient resource allocation by
disrupting the price signals that incentivize consumers to use the
resources that are cheapest to produce or least scarce. Most attempts at
exploiting consumers involve causing consumers to behave as though
demand were higher by making the price of the product appear lower

5. See, e.g., Antonio Rosato, Selling Substitute Goods to Loss-Adverse Consumers:
Limited Availability, Bargains and Rip-Offs 19-20 (Sept. 17, 2012) (preliminary draft),
available at httpJ/www.web.stanford.edu/group/SITE/archive/SITE_2012/2012_segment.
6_papers/rosato.pdf.
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than the price the consumer will actually end up paying. Because the
product appears cheaper, the consumer purchases more than is optimal
and may consume a more costly product at the expense of a cheaper
substitute. The inefficiency continues after the consumer enters into the
contract. Once the consumer purchases the product, he may still face
incentives that do not reflect the cost he is inflicting on the seller.
For example, a credit card company's desire to make the product seem
cheaper may lead it to offer an introductory annual percentage rate
(APR) of 0% for six months that then increases to 15% even though the
cost of the capital to the lender is constant over the entire length of the
contract. 6 The consumer faces a cost that is below the cost of the capital
in the introductory period and a cost that is above the cost of the capital
7
in the post-introductory period. Thus, the consumer will have the
incentive to consume too much capital for six months when another
party values the capital more, followed by a period when he has the
incentive to'consume too little capital. The credit card company's
marketing scheme prevents capital from flowing to the party that values
it most.
How Sellers Exploit Consumers
To exploit the consumer's cognitive biases, the seller must cause him
to overestimate the value of the product or underestimate the price.
Causing the consumer to underestimate the price is more sustainable by
sellers. A seller would have a hard time marketing a product without
8
representing it as fit for a given purpose. Products that are not fit for
their stated purpose are easily identified, and this information travels
quickly among consumers.9 However, sellers can often avoid stating the
price the consumer will pay, either by breaking the price into components or basing part of the price upon contingencies. While misleading
the consumer about the value of the product is possible, sellers have
demonstrated their ability to mislead consumers about price for decades
at a time. As Part III.A will explain, contracts involving multiple
transactions with various fees are essential for long-term exploitation.
These contracts allow the seller to lead the consumer to underestimate

A.

6. See 0% APR Credit Cards:Apply Now, CREDITCARDS.COM, http://www.creditcards.
com/0-apr-credit-cards.php (last visited Sept. 8,2013) (advertising a number of credit cards
that offer a 0% introductory APR that increases to over 20% after a year).
7. See BAR-GILL, supra note 1, at 69-70.
8. See U.C.C. § 2-315 (2003); see also 15 U.S.C. § 2308 (2012).

9. In many cases this would also implicate the warranty provisions of the Uniform

Commercial Code and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 2308; U.C.C. § 2315.
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the price of the product by shifting costs to a price component the
consumer pays less attention to.1°
Other characteristics further facilitate exploitation by inhibiting
consumers' defenses to sellers' trickery. Part III.B will discuss how
individualization of products increases the cost of consumer education.
Part III.C will discuss how infrequent purchases prevent consumers from
learning from their own experience. Part III.D will discuss how new
markets have lower levels of learning because consumers have not yet
become familiar with the products' or the sellers' tricks. Finally, Part
III.E will discuss how consumers that are not middle-aged or who are
uneducated make up a large proportion of consumers that are easy to
exploit. If more consumers are easily exploited, fewer will be lost to
competitors when sellers use exploitative tactics. Thus, the presence of
consumers that are especially young, old, or uneducated decreases the
incentive not to exploit.
III.

MARKET CHARACTERISTICS THAT FACILITATE EXPLOITATION

A.

MultitransactionalContracts with MultidimensionalPrices
Some contracts involve one transaction-$1 for a hamburger-while
other contracts involve more than one-a $15 monthly payment for a
membership to a "hamburger club" where the consumer can purchase
hamburgers for ten cents. The second contract, which involves multiple
transactions and multidimensional pricing, is far more likely to lead to
exploitation." This is partially because the second contract is inherently more complicated and at least requires the consumer to do some
additional work to evaluate whether the product is worth the price,
allowing an opportunity for error. 2 However, the requirement of
arithmetic is only a partial explanation of why this type of contract
facilitates exploitation. For example, when a mail-in rebate is offered,
the prices before and after the rebate are often provided for the
consumer, yet the use of rebates is frequently a vehicle for consumer
exploitation. 3 Part of the ease of exploitation comes from multidimensional pricing: the price is broken up into more than one piece rather
than a lump sum.14 Multidimensional pricing facilitates exploitation
because it allows sellers to hide the true cost of the product from

10. See, e.g., BAR-GILL, supra note 1, at 19-20.
11. See, e.g., id. at 18.
12. See, e.g., id. at 18-19.
13. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 3, at 384-96.
14. See, e.g., Oren Bar-GifU, The BehavioralEconomicsof Consumer Contracts,92 MINN.
L. REV. 749, 769-76 (2008) [hereinafter Bar-Gfil, Behavioral Economics].
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consumers.15 The hamburger club salesperson can focus the consumer's
attention on the ten-cent hamburger and hope that the consumer does
not adequately consider the $15 monthly charge.
However, merely breaking up the price into smaller components is not
1
enough to prevent the consumer from appreciating the price. " The
consumer will certainly be cognizant of the $15 monthly charge when he
signs up for the plan. But, if the salesperson charges ten cents for the
hamburger at the time of sale and $15 at the end of the month, the
consumer will be contractually bound by the time he fully appreciates
the entire price. By combining multidimensional pricing with contracts
involving multiple transactions, sellers can defer the consumer's
appreciation of price until after the consumer is committed to the
purchase.17 This combination of multidimensional pricing in multitransactional contracts will be referred to as "MPMCs," or multidimensionally priced, multitransactional contracts.
The seller may use MPMCs to prevent the consumer from appreciating
the price of the product in two ways. The seller may downplay
components of the price, or the seller may take advantage of the
consumer's inability to accurately estimate the probability of certain
18
These two methods are not
contingencies on which price depends.
mutually exclusive, and sellers frequently use both methods simultaneously.19
1. Downplaying Price Components. MPMCs allow the seller to
advertise an appealingly low portion of its price without necessarily
2
lowering the total price of the product. " A credit card can prominently
advertise a low introductory APR while downplaying the higher longterm APR, and a cellular-service provider can advertise a cheaper
21
monthly fee while charging a higher price to send a text message.
The seller shifts total cost of the product away from the price that is
salient to the consumer and towards the 22price that the consumer either
to.
does not notice or pays less attention

15. See BAR-GILL, supra note 1, at 18; see generally Bar-Gill, Behavioral Economics,

supra note 14, at 769-76.
16. See BAR-GILL, supra note 1, at 18.

17. See, e.g., Bar-Gill, Behavioral Economics, supra note 14, at 769-76.
18. See, e.g., id.
19. See, e.g., id.
20. See, e.g., id. at 770 (discussing rebates and seller exploitation).
21. See, e.g., id.at 771-72; 0% APR Credit Cards: Apply Now, supra note 6; see also
BAR-GILL, supra note 1, at 19-20.

22. See, e.g., Bar-Gill, Behavioral Economics, supra note 14, at 772 (discussing credit
cards and price shifting).

564

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

Because people are myopic, shifting the price to the less salient costs
often involves shifting the cost to a later point in time-for example, "No
payments for one year!". 23 Escalating payments are common across the
consumer finance industries, especially with credit card plans,'
subprime loans, 25 and financing of retail purchases. This strategy is
effective.2 6 In fact, consumers are three times as sensitive to changes
in the introductory rates of credit cards as they are to changes in postintroductory rates, even though most borrowing happens in the postintroductory period. Cost shifting to less salient components may also
involve listing fees separately without listing their total cost, so that
each fee looks insignificant.'
In the subprime mortgage industry,
sellers list mandatory fees separately, even though they could easily be
incorporated into one fee because mandatory fees never vary.29 In all
of these cases, cost shifting to less salient components and downplaying
costs cause the consumer to underestimate the total cost of the contract,
and the seller sells more of the product than he would at the same total
price than if the components were priced at their marginal cost.
2. Taking Advantage of Consumers' Inaccurate Estimates of
Probabilities. Sellers frequently charge a fee for some contingencies,
such as extra services or penalties, 0 and will sometimes offer a reward
for other contingencies, such as on-time payments. 1 Consumers are
optimistic on average, and sellers can take advantage of this optimism,
causing consumers to underestimate the price.12 As long as sellers
charge for the contingencies the consumer does not want to happen and
reward the contingencies the consumer does want to happen, consumers'
optimism will lead them to underestimate price. 33 They will tend to
overestimate the reward contingencies and underestimate the fee

23. See, e.g., id.
24. See Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 1373, 1392 (2004).
25. See Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics, and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage
Contracts,94 CORNELL L. REV. 1073, 1108 (2009) thereinafter Bar-Gill, SubprimeMortgage
Contracts].
26. See, e.g., Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, supra note 24, at 1392.
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Bar-Gill, Subprime Mortgage Contracts,supra note 25, at 1116.
29. Id.
30. Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, supra note 24, at 1393.
31. E.g., Jeremy M. Simon, New Discover Motiva creditcard rewardson-time payment,
CREDITCARDS.COM (May 1, 2007), http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/discovercard-rewards-motiva-1273.php.

32. See Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic,supra note 24, at 1375-76.
33. See id. at 1376.
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When consumers underestimate price, they purchase
contingencies.'
more of the product.35
Because consumers will underestimate the price of contingencies,
36
This
sellers shift more of the price of the product to contingent fees.
cost
the
above
far
often
are
fees
penalty
why
explains
likely
technique
37
and
card
credit
the
in
are
they
as
seller,
the
to
payment
of the late
3
in
fees
the
that
shown
has
Research
"
markets.
subprime-mortgage
lending
of
risk
increased
the
by
justified
entirely
those industries are not
to someone who does not pay on time, nor are they justified by the lost
time-value of money.39 Likewise, late fees at video rental stores are
typically much higher than the per-day cost of the initial rental, even
The cost of
though the cost of lending out the video is the same.'
plan is no
phone
cell
minute
a
500
transmitting the 501st minute on
consumer
the
to
cost
the
yet
minute,
higher than transmitting the 500th
4'
mail-in
in
used
is
technique
is often many times higher. The same
42
in the
sending
of
likelihood
Consumers overestimate the
rebates.
43
Thus,
product.
the
of
cost
rebate, and therefore underestimate the
on
dependent
price
the
of
MPMCs allow the sellers to make more
contingencies.
3. Use of MPMCs to Shift Costs Causes Inefficient Resource
Allocation. Cost shifting reduces social welfare. It distorts the market
by causing overconsumption of the product as a whole and underconsumption of the portion of the product that the cost is shifted to. For
example, if the cost of a cell phone plan is shifted away from the
monthly fee (which consumers are made aware of) to a higher price for
individual text messages (which consumers do not adequately consider),
then consumers will buy more cell phone plans than is efficient and send
fewer text messages. The consumer underestimates the total cost of the
phone plan, so marginal consumers may pay more for the product than
their subjective values of it. If the cost to the seller of transmitting a
text message is one cent, but cost shifting causes the cost to the

34. See id.

35. See id.
36. See id. at 1400.
37. See id. at 1394.
38. See Bar-Gill, Subprime Mortgage Contracts, supra note 25, at 1117.
39. See id.; Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, supra note 24, at 1394.
40. See infra Part II.E (describing how the problem has begun to subside as traditional
video rental services have faced competition from Netflix and Redbox).
41. Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, supra note 24, at 1429-30.

42. See Edwards, supra note 3, at 390-92.
43. Id.
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consumer to be five cents, then text messages that the consumer values
at three cents will not be sent even though they would increase social
welfare. Instead of the price components reflecting the cost to the seller
of different components of the product, the cost shifts to the price
components that lead the consumer to underestimate the total price. As
a result, the consumer's cost does not reflect marginal cost as accurately
as it would in a competitive market where the consumer fully understood the cost.
However, many uses of MPMCs are not exploitative. Cell phone plans,
loans, and many services would likely use MPMCs even if they could not
be used to exploit consumers. Sellers use MPMCs for socially beneficial
purposes, such as aligning the consumer's marginal cost of use with the
seller's marginal expense of providing the product." The exploitation
and welfare loss come from misleading cost shifting, which is not a
necessary aspect of multidimensional pricing or multitransactional
contracts. But some sellers introduce MPMCs for products where this
type of contract is unusual, such as retail purchases. In these cases, it
seems that cost shifting to exploit consumers is often a primary
motivation for the use of MPMCs.
4. Introduction of MPMCs for Exploitative Purposes and Its
Limitations. Mail-in rebates and bundling are two methods of
introducing MPMCs to ordinary retail purchases. These techniques are
sometimes used for exploitative cost shifting. Rebates break the contract
into two transactions: an up-front price and a partial return of money.45
Bundling can be used to shift costs to a later point in time.4' For
example, a seller that makes printers and ink cartridges can charge less
for the printer and more for the ink.47 Consequently, the purchase
appears cheaper to the consumer when he enters into the deal.4" Both
of these techniques are potentially applicable to a great deal of retail

44. For example, a customer who rents a video for two days causes roughly twice the

opportunity cost to the rental company, and he should therefore be charged about twice as
much in order to align his incentives with the cost to the company. Redbox charges
customers a uniform fee for each day of video rental, so it is effectively indifferent between

two users renting a video for one day or one user renting it for two days, while its
customers have the proper incentive to return the video early if convenient. See Rental
Terms and Conditions, REDBOX, http://www.redbox.com/rentalterms (last visited Sept. 7,
2013).
45. See Edwards, supra note 3, at 367.
46. See Oren Bar-Gill, Bundling and Consumer Misperception, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 33,
35 (2006).
47. See id. at 34.
48. See id. at 34-35.
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purchases, but only a minority of products make use of them. A variety
of constraints prevent these techniques from being profitable with most
products.
Bundling. Bundling is the most limited method of introducing
MPMCs. The seller can use bundling to shift price to a later point in
time by charging less for a durable good and more for the consumable
that the durable good uses.49 For example, a company might decrease
the amount it charges for printers (the durable good) but increase the
5°
For this to
amount that it charges for ink (the consumable good).
good it
durable
the
between
exclusivity
ensure
must
company
work, a
shift
to
wants
it
good
consumable
the
and
from
away
cost
shift
wants to
51
companies
other
that
ensure
must
company
printer
The
costs to.
52
If
cannot capture much of the market for the ink the printers use.
it
can
then
component,
consumable
compatible
a
makes
firm
another
undercut the price of the firm that intends to shift costs from the
durable good to the consumable good. In that case, the bundling firm
will lose money on the durable good without recouping the loss on sales
of the consumable. This type of bundling is thankfully limited because
it reduces welfare by causing overconsumption of the durable good and
underconsumption of the consumable goods once consumers have
purchased the durable good.53
Rebates. The more flexible method of introducing MPMCs is the use
of rebates. Rebates allow the seller to make part of the price contingent
on the consumer not redeeming the rebate.' Consumers overestimate
55
their likelihood of redemption and thus underestimate the price.
While rebates can be used in more products than bundling, they are also
limited by market characteristics. Rebates can be costly to the issuer if
it underestimates the rate at which consumers will redeem them and if
5
the after-rebate price is below the cost of making the product. " Seller
surplus is limited in competitive markets, so the after-rebate price will
likely be below the cost of producing the product if the rebate is for any
substantial value. Because of the risk of losing money on the rebate, the
seller must be sure that consumers will not redeem at a high rate or the

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

See, e.g., id. at 38-39, 38 n.14.
See id. at 38-39.
See id. at 53.
See id.
See id. at 35.
See Bar-Gill, Behavioral Economics, supra note 14, at 769-70.
See id. at 770.
See id.
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reason for use of the rebate beyond
seller must have an additional
57

exploiting consumer optimism.

Sellers can be more certain that consumers will overestimate the
likelihood of redemption by targeting the most naive consumers. Thus,
rebates may be expected more often with goods purchased by the
young,58 uneducated, or poor.
In addition, the price of the product must be in the appropriate range
to ensure underestimation. No consumer will intend to send in a tencent rebate; the rebate must at least be high enough to overcome the
added transaction cost of redeeming it. Yet, virtually all consumers will
send in a $5,000 rebate. The value must be high enough for the
consumer to want to redeem it, but low enough for the consumer to
procrastinate and eventually forget to redeem it. By limiting the value
of the rebate, these restraints limit the price range of the products on
which rebates will be offered. The rebate has to make up a sufficient
portion of the price of the product to be salient to the consumer. A
consumer may disregard a $100 rebate on a $20,000 car, and he would
rather not deal with a $50 rebate for a $51 hamburger.
These restraints limit the use of rebates to mislead consumers about
price, but non-exploitative rebates may be present in many industries for
other uses. Apart from exploitation, rebates are used to price discriminate, to lower prices temporarily without affecting consumers' perception
of the "regular" price, and to gather information about customers.5 9
Thus, the presence of rebates in a given market does not necessarily
indicate consumer exploitation. In fact, recent developments indicate
that exploitative uses may be decreasing as retailers are working to
make the redemption process easier for consumers, while others are
abandoning rebates altogether.6 °
B. Individualizationof ProductsInhibits Learning from Others
A consumer who uses boxes to ship clothes will have different
preferences about his box's characteristics than a consumer who ships
bricks. As a result, the clothes shipper cannot as easily rely on the brick
shipper's opinions about the best box. The box is somewhat individualized with respect to these two consumers. A product is "individualized"
to the extent that, when fully informed, consumers would have different
preferences as to the optimal characteristics of the product.6 '

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

See
See
See
See
See

id.
infra Part IMl.D.
Edwards, supra note 3, at 372.
id. at 419-20.
Bar-Gill, Behavioral Economics, supra note 14, at 756-57.
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Individualization increases the ease of consumer exploitation because
it raises the cost of learning from other persons. It limits the ability for
consumers to be educated by a simple recommendation of the best
product. Empirical evidence demonstrates that interpersonal learning
is slower with individualized products.62 For a consumer to choose his
optimal product, he must understand the characteristics of the product
6 3 This
and how they relate to his own purposes and preferences.
process is more complex and costly than simply accepting a recommendation, and the chance of error is therefore higher. This inhibition of
learning prevents full competition over the characteristics that fully
informed consumers would prefer and leads instead to competition over
characteristics of the product that appear important to consumers.6
At least two characteristics can cause a product to be individualized:
(1) the product is not available to all consumers due to restraints (such
as credit); and (2) the product is used for multiple purposes, so consumer
preferences about the product features would differ even if consumers
were fully informed.
Credit cards are individualized for both reasons. First, consumers are
heterogeneous with respect to risk, so a deal offered to one consumer
may not be available to another with worse credit.6" Thus, a consumereducation effort cannot simply offer a recommended product because the
best deal will not be available to many consumers. The effort must
partially educate the consumer about the advantages and disadvantages
of different credit card plans so that he can pick the best deal that will
be given to him. This means the consumer has to expend considerably
more effort to find the best deal, and because that effort now requires
understanding the complexities of credit card plans, it is subject to more
error by the consumer and exploitation of cognitive limitations by the
credit card provider.
In addition to the problem of some deals not being available to all
consumers, consumers use credit cards for varying purposes. Some use
them interchangeably with debit cards to facilitate transactions without
carrying large amounts of cash. Others use credit cards as a means of
personal finance. These two purposes mean that even fully informed
consumers with the same credit history would have different preferences.
The transaction facilitators would prefer increased reward programs,
such as airline mileage, at the expense of higher APRs, whereas the
borrowers would prefer the reverse. These different preferences are a

62.
63.
64.
65.

See
See
See
See

id. at 756.
id. at 757.
id.
hi. at 766.
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further barrier to consumer education because they prevent the use of
a simple recommendation that would be applicable to all or most
consumers. Furthermore, because most consumers fall somewhere on
the spectrum between borrowers and transaction facilitators, a consumer
educator cannot make one recommendation for each type of consumer.
This leads to the more costly necessity of having the consumer understand the plan rather than merely accept a simple recommendation.
The increased cost of educating each consumer can greatly facilitate
exploitation. While educating consumers might be cost justified from a
social perspective, it may not be in the interest of any one entity. One
mechanism that often protects consumers is that other sellers have the
incentive to point out the flaws in their competitors' products.6 But
this mechanism is limited by a free-riding problem. When the seller
alerts consumers to the exploitation, some of the sales that result will be
captured by other sellers that do not exploit consumers.6 7 In markets
for complex, individualized products, the cost of educating each consumer
is higher, but the benefit of each sale is not. Consequently, the cost of
educating the consumer will more often be greater than the profit from
increased sales. Thus, individualization decreases the incentives for
sellers to protect consumers from competing sellers.
C. Infrequency of PurchasePrevents Learning from Experience
Even in complex financial transactions, consumers do learn from their
mistakes. One need not understand amortization or compound interest
to notice when a transaction turns out differently than expected, just as
one need not understand how a computer works to know that it is
broken. Research shows that consumers are more than 40% less likely
to receive a penalty on their credit card in the month following a
penalty, but this learning is eventually forgotten. 68 However, decisionmaking about which product to choose appears to improve substantially
over the length of consumers' lives in a variety of markets.69 For

66. See Richard A. Epstein, Behavioral Economics: Human Errors and Market
Corrections,73 U. CHI. L. REV. 111, 119-20 (2006).

67. See Howard Beales et al., The Efficient Regulationof ConsumerInformation,24 J.L.
& ECON. 491, 527 (1981).
68. Sumit Agarwal et al., Learningin the CreditCard Market 3 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. W13822, 2008), available at httpJ/www.nber.org/papers/w
13822.
69. See generally Sumit Agarwal et al., The Age of Reason: FinancialDecisionsover the
Life-Cycle with Implicationsfor Regulation (Brookings Papers on Econ. Activity, Working
Paper No. 973790, 2009), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=973790.
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example, the frequency of rate-changing mistakes in borrowing drops
7°
from 70% for twenty-year olds to 10% in fifty-year olds.
This ability to learn from experience is particularly important when
sellers are able to conceal aspects of the price in hidden fees and other
7
clauses that are not salient to the consumer upon purchase. Mistakes
are an especially important source of information here. Whatever may
be hidden from or seem insignificant to the consumer at the time of
purchase will more likely be recognized upon payment. Especially with
complex financial products, the cost of the mistake will turn an abstract
mathematical idea into a concrete payment that is more likely to be felt
and acted upon.
Even if consumers frequently purchase a product, the market may
show these effects if many of the consumers are young because young
consumers have not yet had time to learn from experience. The markets
for credit cards, rebates, cell-phone plans, and payday loans are all
frequently accused of exploitation even though consumers regularly enter
these contracts. Perhaps it demonstrates the importance of experience,
because each of these markets is aimed largely at younger purchasers.
The infrequency of contracting offers a stronger explanation for
exploitation in markets where middle-aged consumers are frequently
exploited, such as the market for subprime mortgages. Perhaps the
degree of exploitation in that market would be lower if consumers
bought houses more frequently.
When consumers purchase a product infrequently, it is harder for
them to rely on the sellers' reputations. Part III.E will discuss the
decreased reputational effects in the context of new markets.
Consumers Who Are Not Middle-Aged Are the Easiest to Exploit
Twenty-year olds suffer from naivety and lack of discipline, but have
the best cognitive ability.72 Consumers grow wiser with age, but their
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The aforementioned study offers evidence of the strength of this factor
in the ten credit markets it analyzed,7 and rebate practices may offer
evidence of the importance of young consumers in allowing exploitation
in retail markets. As discussed above, mail-in rebates provide the
opportunity to introduce multidimensional pricing into any store-bought
product.7 6 Since multidimensional pricing appears to facilitate consumer exploitation and thus increase profits, why are rebates not offered on
every retail product in the appropriate price range?77 This lack of
rebates may be because rebates work especially well on naive, younger
consumers who are more likely to overestimate their likelihood of
sending in the rebate. If consumers are too good at estimating their
likelihood of sending in the rebate, then the rebate will decrease profits
by creating adverse selection for consumers who send in rebates.7" The
importance of having a large proportion of young consumers may explain
the unusual prevalence of rebates in the consumer-electronics industry.7 9 One study demonstrated that 50% of personal-computer offers
contain rebates.80 Another study showed that almost 75% of ads placed
for phones, computers, and software contained rebate offers in 2002."1
There does not appear to be data on the prevalence of rebates across all
retail markets, but common experience would indicate that it is well
below 50% or 75%.

75. Id.
76. See supra Part IIIHA.4.
77. See id. (describing the appropriate price range).
78. See Richard A. Epstein, The Neoclassical Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92

MINN. L. REV. 803, 828 (2008).
79. A skeptic might claim that another potential explanation for the higher prevalence

of rebates in consumer electronics is that the market is characterized by high fixed costs
and low variable costs. The low variable cost may cause the price discriminatory function
of rebates to function more efficiently. A seller can recover the variable cost of producing
an additional unit as well as a fraction of the fixed costs from the highly price-sensitive

consumers. From the less price-sensitive customers, the seller can recover the variable cost
of the units sold to them, the remaining fixed costs, and the profit. This recovery would
allow the producer to sell more units, and therefore lower the cost per unit. The profit

would come from the sales to the less price-sensitive customers, but the sales to the more
price-sensitive customers would allow more units to be produced, lowering the average cost

per unit. This is only a partial explanation. All manufactured goods have high fixed costs
and low variable costs, yet rebates are offered far more often with consumer electronics
than other manufactured goods. Absent a reason to believe the difference between fixed
costs and variable costs is higher with consumer electronics than with other manufactured
goods, this explanation appears incomplete.
80. Edwards, supra note 3, at 363.
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The youth of credit card borrowers may partially explain the high
levels of exploitation in that market as well. Young people make up an
especially high proportion of credit card holders, are heavily targeted by
credit card issuers, 2 and are the most profitable age group (especially
following college graduation).' These market characteristics facilitate
exploitation, and therefore create an incentive for the industry to orient
its contracts towards exploitation. Because exploitative contracts make
up a high proportion of the market, consumers who do not educate
themselves or shop around are likely to be exploited. The high
proportion of young people prevents the educated consumers from
protecting the naive consumers. It decreases the proportion of consumers that sellers will lose by using exploitative tactics, thus decreasing an
incentive not to exploit.
Markets made up disproportionately of much older consumers should
demonstrate the same effect, but it will not be as strong as the effect on
markets with high proportions of young consumers. The data in one
study demonstrates that cognitive skills degenerate slowly enough that
eighty-year olds scored better than twenty-year olds in eight out of ten
measures of consumer competence." Because there are fewer eightyyear olds than twenty-year olds, eighty-year olds consume less than
twenty-year olds, and they are more competent consumers, the effects of
a large proportion of old consumers should be much weaker than the
effects of large proportions of young consumers.
E. Consumers in New Markets Lack Learningfrom Experience and
Learningfrom Others
5
Learning is a primary defense against exploitation. This defense
is almost always the result of the experience of being exploited because
an exploitative technique that most consumers will figure out the first
time they encounter it will not spread among sellers.' Consumers will
not begin the learning process until sellers implement a misleading
practice, so the situation in which sellers have implemented exploitive
practices, but consumers have not learned about it, will occur more often
soon after a market arises. This lag in learning can be expected to affect
learning from experience, as well as learning from others. Consumers

82. See Creola Johnson, Maxed Out College Students: A Call to Limit Credit Card
Solicitationson College Campuses, 8 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POLy 191, 191-92 (2004).
83. See id. at 201 n.52.
84. See Agarwal et al., Learning in the Credit CardMarket, supra note 68, at 2-17.
85. BAR-GILL, supra note 1, at 26.
86. See id. at 27.
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need time to discover the practice, and consumer educators need time to
disseminate the information after discovering the exploitation.
Many exploitative practices have been mitigated over time by
competition and learning. Consumers become dissatisfied with the
exploitive practice, a market niche opens up, and competitors that do not
engage in the practice attract those dissatisfied consumers. For
example, Blockbuster used to charge a per-day late fee that was as high
as the initial rental fee.87 This pricing was a way of shifting the price
to less salient components and taking advantage of consumers'
systematic optimism.' The late-fee model survived for two decades,
until Netflix began offering a monthly subscription service without late
fees. 89 The two largest video rental companies, Hollywood Video and
Blockbuster, eventually began offering the monthly subscription service
as well.9 Redbox later entered the market and set up a fee structure
in which the customer pays a uniform daily fee up to the cost of the
video, at which point the customer owns the video.91 Over time, the
price customers paid for video rentals became aligned with the companies' marginal costs.
This same trend appears to be occurring with the use of rebates.9 2
The exploitative use of rebates is decreasing, with many retailers
working to make the redemption process easier for consumers, while
others are abandoning rebates altogether. 93 Some retailers are even
offering instant rebates at checkout, eliminating the potential for
exploitation. Retailers claim they are responding to consumer dissatisfaction, 94 indicating that consumers' naivety may be decreasing as they
gain experience with rebates.
In addition to having more naive consumers, sellers in new markets
are less likely to have established reputations. Consumers can use seller
reputation as a substitute for understanding complex products.95 The
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use of reputation can facilitate learning from others, counteracting some
of the ease of exploitation that comes from individualized products.
The lack of reputation among the new firms that entered the
subprime-mortgage market has been cited as a contributor to the
exploitation that took place. With the advent of securitization, smaller
firms had more access to capital, and many new firms entered the
market.' When combined with other exploitation-friendly characteristics of subprime lending, such as individualized product, infrequent
contracting, multidimensional pricing, multitransactional contracts, and
customers that are uneducated and not middle-aged, a great amount of
inefficient transactions occurred.
IV. CONCLUSION

It appears that the most important facilitator of consumer exploitation
is the use of MPMCs. The other characteristics listed inhibit mechanisms-such as learning from experience or learning from others-that
would otherwise protect consumers from sellers' use of MPMCs to cost
shift. This description provides some information about the scope of the
problem, as MPMCs are common yet limited in potential usage."
Because so much of the evidence of consumer exploitation comes from
markets dominated by MPMCs, one should not overgeneralize that
evidence to conclude that exploitation is as common outside those
markets.
The mechanisms described in this paper may also shed light on
potential regulatory solutions. The price components of MPMCs are
multiple
tricky to regulate directly because multidimensional pricing and
9
transactions within each contract have many efficient uses. " While a
recommendation for a solution would require a cost-benefit analysis
outside the scope of this paper, regulators should take note of the
characteristics of these markets and the mechanisms that facilitate
exploitation. In particular, regulators should focus on the importance of
price components deviating from the marginal cost of added services in
facilitating consumer exploitation.
In addition to using the characteristics described above to identify
exploitative markets and craft regulatory solutions, regulators could
focus on these characteristics when evaluating the success or failure of
a regulatory strategy that has been tried across markets. For example,
evidence of effectiveness in one market could better predict the results

96. See id.
97. See supra Part III.A.4.
98. See supra Part IIIHA.3.
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of another if both markets have the same exploitation-facilitating
characteristics.

